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MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONARY OFFICIAL ACTS 
T WO recent cases, one in Michigan and one in Iowa, bring up again the insistent question of judicial control over adminis-
trative action and the oft-repeated distinction between "ministerial" 
and "discretionary" official acts. <') 
In Samuels v. Coitzens,1 plaintiff sought mandamus to compel the 
mayor of Detroit to issue him a license to engage in the jewelry 
business under an ordinance "to regulate and license" such 'busi-
nesses. The _ordinance, which was very short, provided that "no 
person * * * shall engage in the business of selling jewelry * * * 
without first having obtained a license from the mayor * * *" It 
required a written application to the mayor, containing an agree-
ment on the part of the applicant that "he will accept the license, 
if granted him, and that it may be revoked at the will of the mayor." 
A third section required the filing of a "sufficient surety bond" in 
the sum of $200 "to cover any loss or damage to any citizen doing 
business with such licensee," and required the payment of a license 
fee of one dollar. Plaintiff tendered to the mayor a concededly 
proper application and bond, but the mayor refused to grant a license 
"for the reason that plaintiff had theretofore been in the habit of 
deceiving and defraudit?-g the public as to the quality of the jewelry 
sold by him, and had so conducted his business that it was not in 
the public interest that he should be permitted to continue the same." 
A judgment for defendant was affirmed, the court saying that the 
ordinance conferred on the mayor "a reasonable discretion in the 
issue of such license." In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Wiest, J., 
urged that the ordinance was void as conferring on the mayor "arbi-
trary" and "uncontrolled" power. 
In Lloyd v. Ramsay,2 plaintiff sought mandamus and also invoked 
certiorari to compel the Secretary of State of Iowa and the Execu-
tive Council to issue a certificate of incorporation to the "Federal 
Oil Company." The statute3 contains the following provision:. 
"When articles of incorporation are presented to the Sec-
1 183 N. W. 925 (Mich., 1921). 
2 183 N. W. 333 (Iowa, 1921). 
a Iowa Code Supplement, 1913, Sec. 1610. 
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retary of State for the purpose of being filed, if he is satis-
fied that they are in proper form to meet the requirements 
of law, that their object is a lawful one and not against pub-
lic policy, that their plan of_ doing business, if any be pro-
vided for, is honest and lawful, he shall file them; but if he 
is of the opinion that they are not in proper form to meet 
the requirements of the law, or that their object is an 
unlawful one, or against public policy, or that their plan of 
doing business is dishonest or unlawful, he shall refuse to 
file the same." 
From an adverse decision of the Secretary an appeal to the 
Executive Council (consisting of the Governor, Secretary, Treas-
urer and Auditor of the State) was provided for, and the same 
grounds of decision were prescribed. The Secretary refused to 
file plaintiff's articles b_ecause of the gross disproportion between 
the amount of common and preferred stock ($5,000 common and 
$195,000 preferred), which he "declared to be "against public pol-
icy,'' and the Executive Council sustained his decision on the ground 
that "the said articles were contrary to good business practice." A 
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the court unanimously hold-
ing that the approval of articles under 'this statute was not a "purely 
ministerial act," but involved the exercise of discretion, and that 
the Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction .. 
What is the basis for the distinction between "ministerial" and 
"discretionary" official acts? How do courts determine in which 
class a particular official act belongs ? ·What are the legal conse-
quences of the distinction? Upon what grounds or motives may 
"discretionary" official action be predicated? The present discus-
sion will be devoted to attacking some of these problems by the 
methods of legal analysis. Public law problems have frequently 
been attacked 'by comparative, historical and sociological methods; 
more rarely by analytical methods.4 
r. "Executive" and "Jiulicial" Acts. The term "ministerial" has 
often been invoked to describe non-judicial acts generally. Thus, 
4 E. g., BURGESS, CoMPARA'l'~ C0Ns'l'1Tu'l'10NAI.. LAW; GoonNow, CoM-
PARA'l'm .AI>Mrn1sTRATm LAw; GHos:e, CoMPARATm AnMrn1sTRATm LAw; 
Ehrlich, "Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentals of its Study, 21 
Cor.uMBIA L. REv. 623. 
850 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
in determining that a statute does not violate the '~separation of 
powers" clause of the state constitution by conferring judicial pow~ 
ers upon non-judicial offi.cers,5 or that it does violate that clause 
by imposing non-judicial duties upon courts,6 courts frequently 
seek to sustain their decisions by naming the official acts called for 
by the statute "ministerial acts." In other words, "ministerial" is 
used as synonymous with "executive." This use of "ministerial" 
is unfortunate, to say the least, but it may be rendered innocuous 
by subdividing "ministerial" acts into those "purely ministerial" 
and those "quasi-judicial."7 Such discrimination is not commonly 
found, and this double use of "ministerial" has contributed to the 
confusion of the courts. Thus, the case of Flournoy v. Jefferson-
ville, 8 involving the question of separation of powers and the "defi-
nition" of "ministerial" therein attempted, has repeatedly been cited 
in cases where the issue was whether a concededly executive (that 
is, non-judicial) act was conclusive against attack in the courts.9 
No court would deny that there are some non-judicial (and non-
legislative) acts which are "discretionary," as opposed to "minis-
terial," in the sense that they are conclusive against attack in the 
courts j yet the double meaning of "ministerial" ("executive" and 
5 Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. l6g ( 1861) ; State v. Le Clair, 86 Me. 
522, 30 Atl. 7 (18g4). 
6 See 7 CoI.UMBIA L. ruv. 003-5, for a discussion of this type of question. 
7 Bruce, J. (rto'\V Professor Bruce of the University of Minnesota Law 
School), in State ex rel. v. Stutsman, 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W. 83 (1912), 
at p. 88. 
s Flournoy v. jef'fersonville (sttPra, n. s.) was a suit by a city to enforce 
a special assessment for street improvements. D~fendant, a property owner, 
urged that the statute under which the proceedings were had was void in 
that it authorized the mayor; council and city clerk to issue a precept for 
the amount of the assessmen,t, which was really the commencement of a 
judicial action for the co11ection of the assessment. The question, then, 
was whether the statute conferred judicial powers on non-judicial officers; 
the court held that "the issuing of the wtit is a ministerial act and may be 
performed by any person upon whom the la\v may cast the duty" (p. 172). 
u Among the many subsequent cases in which this opinion is cited and 
quoted from, may be mentioned :-State ex rel. v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 
64 N. E. 558 (1902) (Mandamus to compel Governor to exercise his power 
of appointing a Lieutenant-Governor); Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 123 
N. W. 705 (1909) (Mamia11ms to compel county commissioners and county 
superintendent of schools to consolidate school districts). 
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"non-discretionary") appears to have led to a tendency, more per-
ceptible in the cases a generation or two ago, to deny conclusiveness 
to all non-judicial o~cial acts. It is not propose~ to discuss here 
the meaning of "ministerial ac.t" as opposed to "judicial act," stricto 
sensu.10 
2. The Kind of Judicial Remedy Invoked. The distinction 
between "ministerial" and "discretionary" acts of non-judicial (and 
non-legislative) officers, which is the particular point to be examined 
'here, has been applied chiefly in cases invol~ing an ~.ttack by a pri-
vate citizen upon the validity or conclusiveness of the act of such 
an officer. \While it has been invoked most frequently where the 
particular judicial remedy used has been mandamus, it is not con-
fined to such cases. The distinction has been applied in actions for 
damages against a public official for refusal to perform an act,11 or 
for performing it negligently or improperly ;12 in suits to enjoin 
official action claimed to be erroneous ;13 in certiorari proceedings 
10 Some further examples of the confusion of terms are :-State v. Gov-
ernor, 25 N. J. L. 331 (1856) (Mandamus denied, to compel Governor to 
issue a commission to an elected officer; the court saying (p. 350) : "As 
contra-distinguished from judicial duties, all duties are ministerial".) Peo-
ple ex rel. v. Jerome, 36 Misc. Rep~ 256, 73 N. Y. S. 3o6 (19m) ("The act 
of every public official is either ministerial or judicial" (p. 257) ). Hamma 
v. People, 42 Colo. 401, 94 Pac. 326 (1908) (defendant was committed for 
contempt of court because he charged that a county judge had kept his ac-
counts of fees and expenditures carelessly; held, not a judicial contempt, 
since the keeping of accounts was a "ministerial," not a "judicial" act). 
11 GooDNOW, PRINCIPLJU> OF ADMlNISTRAT~. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES', 
pp. 295, 296; Grider v. Tally, 77 Afa. 422 (1884) (refusal of liquor license); 
Downer v .• Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856) (refusal of pilot's license), Kendall v. 
Stokes, (U. S.) 3 How. 87, 11 L. Ed. 5o6 (1845) (removing credit from 
books of Postmaster-General's department, placed there by predecessor). 
1 2 Adams v. Schneider, (Ind. App. 1919) 124 N. E. 718, 4 MINNESOTA L. 
REv. 303 (members of school board liable to spectator by falling of defective 
stands at school athletic meet) ; People v. May, 251 Til. 54, 95 N. E. 999 
(19u) (clerk of circuit court liable for carelessly accepting non-resident 
surety on appea1 bond). See, however, McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336 (1868); 
Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904) holding officer liable 
for exercise of a discretionary power. 
13 Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. · S. 1o6, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 
894 (1904); I SPELLING INJUNCTION AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REM-
ltDil~S, (Ed. 2, 1901) §§ 6og-640, 22 CYc. 879 by Judge Henry Wade Rogers. 
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to review the acts of non-judicial officers ;14 and even in rare cases 
where the extraordinary remedy prohibition has been invoked.15 
Moreover, the distinction is frequently invoked in collateral pro-
ceedings where the conclusiveness of an official act is involved; 
as in qito warranto,16 or in an action against a municipal corpora-
tion,17 or by such a corporation or the state.18 Perhaps it has been 
erroneously invoked in many of these cases; however, that cannot 
be determined until the distinction has been defined or the princi-
ples upon which it rests made clear. Taking into account the great . 
variety of cases in which the distinction has been resorted to, it 
seems fair to say that it is, or is intended to be, one test of the 
propriety, extent and method of control by judicial tribunals, stricto 
sensu, over administrative (that is, non-judicial and non-legisla-
tive) 19 action, whether that control be direct or indirect, preventive 
or punitive. 
Is there any underlying conception which runs throughout these 
cases and gives a rational unity to the entire conception? The 
courts usually speak as if there were. The term "quasi-judicial" 
is used so frequently in some connections (particularly in determin-
ing the scope of certiorari) in place of "discretionary" that it is not 
always clear whether the courts are contrasting ,"ministerial" with 
"discretionary" or with "quasi-judicial"; and undoubtedly there are 
official acts which are "discretionary" in the sense that mandamits 
will be refused, and yet are not "quasi-judicial" so that certiorari 
will lie.20 Moreover, it has been said that the United States Supreme 
• 14 Drainage Commissioners v. Griffin, r34 IIL 330, 25 N. E. 995 (I890); 
6 CYc. 752; Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 488 (r872). 
1a State ex rel. v. Stutsman, supra, n. 7; Goodwin v. State, I45 Ala. 536, 
40 So. r22 (r9Q6). 
16 State v. Fidelity and Casua1ty Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 538, 4I N. W. rnS 
(r888) (semble, insurance commissioner's license to foreign insurance com-
pany not conclusive as to its right to do business in the state; int~rpretation 
of statute involved). 
17 Rio Grande County v. Lewis, 28 Colo. 378, 65 Pac. SI (Igor). 
1s State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 74 AtL 392 (r909). 
19 "Non-legislative", is not meant to exclude the exercise of powers of 
a legislative character by officials not constituting a recognized legislative 
body. 
2o In re Saline County Subscription, Thompson et al. Petitioners, 45 Mo. 
52 (r86g); People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 2!9 Ill. 346, 76 N. E. 570 (r9Q6). 
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Court has treated the same act as "ministerial" in mandamus pro-
ceedings and "discretionary" in an action for damages ;21 but a 
careful reading of the decision in question discloses that this opin-
ion is not well founded,22 and it is opposed by several other cases 
which have declared the test to be the same in the two classes of 
cases.23 As a matter of policy, there may be excellent reasons for 
holding that a public official may be coerced by mandamus, a pre-
ventive remedy, to do a particular act, and yet may not be sued for 
damages, after the harm is done, for refusing to do the same act; 
iJmt analytically. it would seem that both remedies postulate the 
existence of a legal duty, to do or not to do the act in question, and 
that to treat an act as "ministerial" in one proceeding and "discre-
tionary" in another would deprive these phrases of all rational con-
tent as substantive concepts to be utilized and applied in reaching 
conclusions in concrete cases, and would indicate that they are mere 
labels to be placed upon conclusions already arrived at on other 
grounds. 
3. ''Ac:ts Involving the Exercise of Discretion or /itdgment." 
Among the attempted definitions one often finds such statements as 
these: "The duty is ministerial, when the law, exacting its dis-
charge, prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of its 
21 GooDNOW, PRINCIPI,ES, p. 400. 
22 In Kendall v. U. S. 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. Ed. n81 (1838), the court held 
that the Postmaster-Gene~al could be compelled by 11ianda11ms to credit the 
relators with the amount found due him by the Solicitor- of the Treasury 
under a special Act of Congress; in Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How1 87, II L. Ed. 
5o6 ( 1845), the court held the Postmaster-General was not liable in an 
action for damages, brought by the relators in the previous case, for erron-
eously causing to be erased or suspended certain credits in favor of plain-
tiffs placed there by the defendant's predecessor jn office, the immunity 
being based on the theory, that this was a "discretionary'' act. In another 
count plaintiffs claimed damages for refusal to pay the claim after the 
special act of Congress and the decision of the Solicitor of the Treasury 
pursuant thereto, which was the same refusal involved in the 111a11da11ms 
case. As to this count, the court confined ~tself to saying: that plaintiffs 
could not have both 111a1ulamus and action for damages for the same wrong 
(election of remedies). See 3 How. gg-103. 
23 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884) ; Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495 
(1878). Contra:-Partridge v. General Council of Medical Education, 25 
Q. B. D. 90 (1890). 
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performance \vith such certainly that nothing remains for judg-
ment or discretioh,''24 and "But where the act to be done involves 
the exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed mere-
ly ministerial."25 
· Such statements would seem to postulate a class of official acts 
in which the official is an automaton; the facts and the statute are 
placed in the machine, a lever is pressed, and out comes the official 
act. Such an official never was on land or sea. Human action 
always involves the exercise of some judgment or discretion. 
But, it may be said, "judgment'' or "discretion" means something 
more than a mere mental operation; it involves intelligent choice 
between two courses of action, where the decision is doubtful or 
difficult of ascertainment. In short, the difference is merely one 
of degree. This explanation, while inconsistent with the dogmatic 
form in which the distinction is usually stated, may serve to point 
to a class of clerical acts which are; "minis~erial", such as entering 
figures in a book,26 or copying a deed into the records. That is, 
granted that the act is to be done, the details as to which the official 
exercises judgment or discretion - the kind of pen he will use, 
whether he will write in long-hand or with a typewriter - are such 
tbat his choice does not affect individual interests, and in this sense 
24 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884), a leading case, wide1y quoted, 
For similar statements, see WYMAN, ADMINlSTRA'.l'IVE 
0
LAw, § 34; People 
ex rel. v. Rosendale, 5 Misc. Rep. 378, 379 ("A ministeria1 duty is one in 
respect to which nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple definite duty 
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.") 
Wailes v. Smith, ComptroUer, 76 Md. 469, 477, 25 Atl. 922 (18g3) ("And 
by 'ministerial' we mean where one is entrusted with the performance of an 
absolute and imperative duty, the discharge of which requires neither the 
exercise of official discretion or judgment".); People v. Jerome, 36 Misc. 
Rep. 256, 257, 73 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (1901) ("A purely ministerial duty is one 
to which nothing is left to discretion") ; Morton v. Comptroller General, 
4 S. ,C. 430, 473, (1873); State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14, 74 Atl. 392 (1909). 
2 5 A. L. Sanborn, "Mandamus", 26 CYc. 160; Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 
422 (1884) 425; Wailes v. Smith, 76 Md. 4(59, 477, 25 Atl. 922 (18g3); Peo-
ple v. Jerome, 36 Misc. Rep. 256, 73 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (1901); Friedman v. 
Mathes, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 488, 502 (1872) (Certiorari to review tax assess-
ments, "If an officer do an act depending on the exercise of the s1ightest 
judgment or discretion on his part, then the act is judicial * * *") ; State 
v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14, 74 Atl. 392 (rgog). 
26 Kendall v. U. S., supra, n. 22. 
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the "discretion involved" in doing such an act, is so unimportant 
that it may be ignored. 
But this reasoning will not solve very many actual controversies. 
In most cases arising under mandanms, for instance, the issue is 
whether the official will do the act, or not, at all. Assuming that the 
official is honest and diligent, and eager to exercise properly the 
statutory powers conferred on him, there still remains the exercise 
of judgment and discretion in choosing the statute applicable, in 
interpreting it, in ascertaining the facts in the particular case, and 
in applying the statute to them. Rarely indeed will it happen that 
these processes will not "involve", in a sztbstantia~ degree, the exer-
cise of judgment and discretion. The recorder of deeds, for in-
stance, when an instrument is presented for record, must interpret 
the recording act, and likewise interpret the instrument, and apply 
the statute to the particular facts; the sheriff in levying on personal 
property must ascertain that the judgment debtor is the owner of it. 
The "judgment and discretion" fovolved in either case is the same 
as that which the judges exercise when the same questions are 
brought before them; yet they hold. that the official acts "minister-
ially". Why? Is it not because tangible property rights are af-
fected and the controversy assumes the aspect of private litigation, 
the kind of questions the courts are constantly deciding, and which 
they consider it their province to decide finally? In other words, 
the courts regard it as a proper case for judicial control ?27 
A slightly different definition is that given in Flournoy v. leffer-
- sonville,28 a statement frequently quoted :-"A ministerial act may, 
perhaps, be defined to be one which a person performs in a given 
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate 
of legal authority, without regard to,· or the exercise of, his own 
judgment upon the propriety of the act being done."29 
The first part of this definition is fairly descriptive of acts done 
by subordinate employees in obedience to a specific command of a 
27 In the case last cited the problem is attacked fundamentalJy, and when 
the court says the act is ministerial, it appears to mean that judicial control 
over such acts will not unduly invade the sphere of executive freedom. 
2s 17 Ind. l6g, 174 (186!). 
2 9 Similar statements in 33 HARV. L. R.Ev. 465; State ex rel. v. Nash, 66 
Ohio St. 6!2, 618, 64 N. E. 558 (1902). 
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superior administrative official. Originally it seems that mandamus 
was such a command from the King, as head of the administrative 
system, to the royal subordinates, prescribing the thing to be done, 
the command created the duty.30 Perhaps the description is suffi-
ciently accurate to designate official acts commanded by special 
Acts of Congress, as in Kendall v. United States,31 where the statute 
directed the Postmaster-General to credit the relaters, naming them, 
with the amount ascertained and fixed by the Solicitor of the Trea.S-
ury-thus, in effect, for that purpose making the .Postmaster-Gen-
eral subordinate and subject to the orders of the Solicitor. How-
ever, for cases where the official acts under a statute, general in its 
terms, which does not command any particular act or identify the 
state of facts except in generic terms, and where the particular 
command is to be issued, not by a superior administrative official 
but by a court which has fallen heir to the vicarious prerogative 
jurisdiction of the King's Bench in mandamus, it is unsound. Stat-
utes are not and cannot be interpreted and applied automatically;· 
the legislature does not and normally cannot command a particular 
act. Now it is the courts whiCh issue the specific command; and 
they are able the more readily to disguise from themselves the fact 
that they are doing so by means of the nineteenth century illusion 
that statutory interpretation was a mechanical process.32 , 
The word "propriety" has a convenient ambiguity which veils the 
latter part of the above quotation. "Propriety of the act being done" 
may include the "propriety" of carrying out the legislature's policy 
as expressed in the statute conferring the official powers. \i\There 
the official acts or refuses to act in manifest disregard of the pol-
icy expressed in the statute, a proper case for judicial control is 
usually presented. This control is usually justified on. the ground 
that the case is one of "arbitrary and illegal" exercise of discretion, 
or "abuse of discretion" ;33 sometimes, however, on the ground that 
so GoonNOW, PRINCIPLES, pp. 42I, and 422, n. 4; HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY 
LEGAL REMEDIES, (Ed. 3) § 2; SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRA-
ORDINARY L~AL Rln.rEDIES, § I365; MERRILL, MANDAMUS, 52. 
31 SuPra, n. 22. . 
3 2 GENY, METHODE n'INTERPRETATION E'.l' SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE Pos1TIF 
(Ed. 2, I9I9) §§ 13, 26; POUND, "Courts and Legislation", in THE SCIENCE 
OF LEGAL ME'J.'HOD, p. 200. 
33 E. g. Reg. v. Boteler, 4 Best & S. 959 (I864) ; In re Gross' License, 
16I Pa. 344, 29 Afl. 25 (I8g4). 
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a "ministerial duty" exists to do the act.34 The real basis of judi-
cial control in such cases is that the official has exercised his power 
from improper motives, upon improper grounds; he has not even 
attempted to apply the statutory norm governing his official action 
to the case in hand. Examples are: Where the licensing board re-
fuses an applicant a license to practice dentistry because he is a 
graduate of a dental college which is a rival of the one with which 
the members of the board are connected34 ; where an official em-
powered to :issue licenses on certain terms refuses to issue any li-
censes at all.35 The emphasis is now shifted from some quality or 
characteristic of the official act to the grounds or motives on which 
the decision of the official, to do or not to do it, is based. If "pro-
priety" has the meaning above suggested-propriety of the legis-
lative policy-, if all official acts are "ministerial" which the official 
performs without wilful disregard of the legislative policy, the 
class of ministerial acts will be extended far beyond the limits laid 
down by the actual decisions. 
If "propriety of the act being done" means the propriety of do-
ing the particular act in the particular case, including the doing 
or not doing of it as well as the method of doing it, it may be noted 
that officials are sometimes held liable in damages for the doing of 
acts which they might have refused to do at all,36 or which they 
could not have been judicially coerced into doing in a particular 
way.37 Yet the nature of the "act" is not changed by the nature 
of the proceeding. 
34 E. g. Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. People ex rel. 
Cooper, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887). 
3 5 See People v. Perry, Mayor, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 206 (1852), where, 
however, the court does not refer to the act as "ministerial". In State v. 
Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 64 N. E. 558 (r902), where the governor had refused 
to exercise his power of appointing a lieutenant-governor, the court said he 
was under a "ministerial duty" to appoint someone, though he had "dis-
cretion" in selecting the person to be appointed. 
36 Adams v. Schneider, (Ind. App. 1919) 124 N. E. 718, 4 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
303 (the court said the members of the school board acted "ministerially" 
in having stands erected for a school athletic meet, though it seems clear 
they wou1d have violated no statute in refusing to hold the meet at all). 
31 In McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336 (1868), the late Judge Dillon held a 
road supervisor liable for diverting a stream of water from plaintiff's land 
in the course of repairing a highway, though he conceded that the defendant 
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Assuming, as we are here; that the official is not wilfully disre-
garding the legislative policy as expressed in the statute, then the 
"propriety of the act being done," as just defined, involves the in-
te].1)retation of the statute, the ascertainment of the facts of the 
particular case, and the application of the statute to the facts. Once 
more we are led back to the illusion that these processes- are me-
chanical, that in performing a certain class of official acts, the offi-
cial acts automatically. "wlthout regard to, or the exercise of, his 
own judgment." No doubt in many instances the official goes 
through these processes unconsciously and simultaneously, but nev-
ertheless they go on. Recording a deed, for example, is one of the 
simplest official acts having far-reaching consequence5 upon private 
interests; yet even here, however routine the operation may be, the 
official exercises judgment. 
But even if we concede that the official does not exercise "judg-
ment" in the routine cases, the same certainly cam1ot be said of the 
abnormal cases in which litigation arises, in the course of which 
the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts may be 
come important. The court would hardly concede that its decision 
of the very: questions which the official-the recorder of deeds, for 
instance-has already passed upon, involves no judgment or dis-
cretion. Moreover, taking the definition literally, if the official 
does in fact exercise his judgment in regard to the propriety of 
the act being done, it is not ministerial; the definition becomes use-
less when most needed. 
If it is meant that an act is "ministerial" when the official oiight 
not to exercise his judgmen~ or discretion as to the propriety of the 
(particular) act being done, we come back to the question whether 
there is a class of acts-indeed, any act-which the official ought 
to do without the exercise of his own judgment. One might as-
sume that an administrative official ought to use his intelligence· in 
performing his duties as much as a judge. It is believed the "defi-
nition" will not stand analysis, and that the repetition of such a 
had "discretion" in improving the highway. Perhaps the mandamus de-
cisions may be distinguished from the cases where the official is held liable 
in damages, on the ground that the "duty" is different in the two cases. 
See Pound, "Legal Rights," 26 INTERN. JouRN. oF E'l.'Hics, at pp. 94-95. In 
the one case the duty is both affirmative (to do) and negative (not to do); 
in the other, it is merely negative. Sed qiiaere? 
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shibboleth can only serve to obscure the nature of the real ques-
tions involved. Attention will be called further on to certain glim-
merings of sense in these definitions.38 
4. The Nature of the Interests Affected. It is believed that 
much of the confusion in American administrative law is due to 
the circumstance tha~, historically, two opposite cross-currents of 
juristic and political tradition have come into play. In the first 
place, the King's Bench, by reason of the fiction that the sovereign 
sat in person as a member of the court, exercised the functions of a 
·superior administrative tribunal39 through its writ of nzandamtts 
(originally a conunand from a superior to an inferior administra-
tive official) and to some extent through other extraordinary pro-
ceedings. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, it became settled 
that the court could review only questions of law, as distinguished 
from questions of fact or expediency; the latter were reviewed by 
the Privy Council.40 The court's jurisdiction survived the abolition 
of the Star Chamber.41 From this division of functions our Amer-
ican courts inherited the principle that courts will not overturn ad-
ministrative decisions on questions of expediency. 
The line between questions of law and questions of expediency 
was no more distinct, in England, than the division between the re-
spective functions of the two tribunals. In general, the Privy Coun-
cil reviewed only those extraordinary cases which could not be ·set-
tled by the common law courts by the application of the ordinary 
principles of law.42 In short, the distinction was not conceptual, 
but functional. It is not surprising, "then, that American courts, 
in the absence of any complementary administrative appellate tri-
bunal comparafile to the Privy Council (or to the Quarter Session;, 
which later absorbed many of its functions) have had considerable 
difficulty in giving a rational content to the concept, "discretionary 
38 Infra, sub-headings 12 'and 13. 
39 GN£IS'l', HISTORY oF THE ENGI.ISH CONS'.l'I'.l'U'.l'ION (Ashworth's trans., 
1886) II, Ch. 48, especially pp. 364, 365, 368-370; GooDNOW, PRINCIPLES, p. 
421. See also MAITLAND, CoNS'.l'I'tU'l'IONAI. Hzs'tORY oF ENGLAND, 134-
40 GoonNow, op. cit, p. 423; GN:e!S'l', op. cit, 
0 
II, p. 218, p. 363. 
41 16 Car. I, c. Io. 
42 GNEIS'l', DAS ENGtISCHE VERFASSUNGS-UND VERWAI.'.l'UNGSGESCHlCH'l'E, 
I (Geschichte und heutige Gestalt der Aemter in England) (1857), §§ 20, 
2I, 30. 
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act." And while the absence of any effective administrative appeal 
has led American courts to extend their control over the adminis-
trative field of action further than the English courts did, yet it is 
still true that the courts will generally refrain' from interfering with 
administrative decisions involving merely questions with which 
courts do not ordinarily deal-e. g., whether a particular individual 
is a proper person to engage in the jewelry business,43 or whether 
a corporation's plan of doing business is contrary to public policy.44 
Generally the courts have not interfered with the exercise of the 
licensing power as a mode of police regulation. 
The other current of tradition flows from a directly opposite 
function. The common law courts came to be looked to as the 
guardian of individual rights of person and property against op-
pressive administrative action. Here the courts were not using a 
vicarious administrative jurisdiction derived from the crown, but 
were invoking the Teutonic conception that the King rules under 
God and the la\v-and the courts refused to renounce their juris-
diction to administer the law. This characteristic Mr. Dicey has 
unduly exaggerated under the name of "the rule of law."45 It be-
came paramount during the struggle between the courts and the 
crown in the seventeenth century.46 
The statute which abolished the Star Chamber serves as a guide 
to the scope of the individual interests thus judicially protected. 
They include the "lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels 
of any of the subjects of this kingdom"47 and freedom of the phys-
ical· person.4 s. The courts have been much more willing to inter-
fere with administrative action· which directly invades the tangible 
property or the physical person of the individual, than where in-
43 Samuels v. Couzens, supra, n. I. 
44 Lloyd v. Ramsay, supra, n. 2. The idea that the Secretary of State 
and the Executive Council can decide this question without the aid of the 
court is apparent throughout the opinion~ 
45 Drc;sY, THI~ LAW oF '.l'HF; CoNSTI'l'UTION, (Ed. 5), chap. IV. 
46 POUND, THE SPIRI'l' oF 'tHE Co:MMON LAW, ch. 3. 
47 16 Car. I; c. ro, sec. 5. The prohibition in this section extends only 
to the King and the Privy Council ; but the preambie, referring to Magna 
Charta, c. 29, and the prnciple of the act, lend color to judicial control over 
all officials. GNF:IS't, Hrs'l'oRY II, 364 n. 
4816 Car. I, c. ro, Sec. VIII, (relating to habeas corpits). 
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tangible interests of substance or of personality are infringed.49 
Where individual interests of the former kind are involved, the 
courts will not be balked of their jurisdiction because the official 
may, for other purposes, be regarded as having "discretion." As 
the late Judge Dillon said :-"The discretion which protects such an 
officer as the road supervisor stops at the boundary where the abso-
lute rights of property begin."50 A property lawyer might say that 
the "absolute rights of property" end wher~ the official's "discre-
tion" begins. The subjective nature of the concept "discretion" 
becomes apparent. Mr. Justice Holmes reasons more intelligibly5i" 
in Miller v. H orton52 when he argues that the direct invasion of 
physical property is a strong motive for interpreting the statute so 
that no discretionary power is conferred. 
On the other hand, where intangible interests of substance or of 
personality are involved, such as that of engaging in a particular 
vocation, courts have been much more willing to concede the exist-
ence of a "discretionary power" to make decisions which will be 
conclusive against judicial attack. The cases of judicial attack on 
the exercise of the licensing power illustrate this tendency.58 Thus, 
in Samuels v. Cottzens,54 administrative action which virtually de-
prived an individual of his interest of substance in the pursuit of a 
lawful calling (engaging in the jewelry business) was held con-
49 It is true that the broader term "liberties" is used in Magna Charta, 
c. 29; and Coke interpreted this as inc1uding freedom to engage in a busi-
ness or vocation. SECOND !NSTI'l'U'l'E, I (1792), 47. 
50 McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336, 350; see sztpra, n. 38. See Lowe v. Con-
roy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904) : "The discretion in which such 
officers are protected must be limited to the line where their acts invade 
the private property rights of another." , 
51 Judge Dillon, in McCord v. High, szepra, argued that the absence of 
other redress was a reason why the property owner should be allowed to 
sue the official, thus introducing the argument ab inconvenienti. 
52 152 .Mass, 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891). 
113 See HIGH, Ex'l'RAORDINARY LEGAL R$:MEDIES (Ed. 3, 1896), § 327; 31 
YAI.~ L. ]OUR. 354- Cf. McCord v. High, sztpra, n. 38, where the official was 
held liable for an erroneous physical invasion of a tangible property right, 
with Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Ia. 244 108 N. W. 3n (1906), where 
officials were held not liable for mere1y orderiiig plaintiff, erroneously, to 
remain in 9.uarantine, without putting any direct physical compulsion on his 
person. , 
54 S1'pra, n. 1. 
.. 
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clusive5s against attack by mandamus. Especially is this apt to be 
true where the liberty or privilege curtailed is one which the legis-
lature might constitutionally prohibit entirely. Thus, in Lloyd v. 
Ranisay56 the court took as its starting point the premise that the 
legislature could grant or refuse corporate charters as it saw fit; 
there was no inalienable right to incorporate. A fortiori, then, the 
- legislature can impose any restrictions it may see fit, including the 
approval of an administrative official. This vicious argument a for-
tiori has been invoked time and again, sometimes to sustain arbi-
·trary administrative action.57 It is submitted, then, that the nature 
of the individual interest involved and of the method in which it 
is infringed by administrative action, is often a decisive factor in 
determining whether the courts will call the official act "ministerial" 
or "discretionary" for purposes of judicial control. 
5. Importance of the Official. While it is often said that the 
ministerial or discretionary character of the official act is to be de-
termined with reference to the particula11 act to be done in the par-
ticular case rather than to the ~mportance of the official's "duties" 
in general,58 nevertheless courts are in varyint degrees influenced 
by the importance or prominence of the office. Aside from the 
holdings that mandamus will not lie against a chief executive/9 
other cases nave emphasized the importance of the office as a potent 
factor in determining whether the "duty" is ministerial -or discre-
tionary. ·Thus, in State es rel. v. Sti~tsmmi,60 Bruce, J., pointed 
55 The court found that the discretion was exercised "reasonably." 
so Supra, n. 2. 
s1 See HENDERSON, TH£ PosrrroN oF FoimIGN CoRPORA'l'IONS IN AMER-
ICAN CoNS'l'I'l'U'J.'IONAI. LAW, passim, especially Chapter VI. 
5S.See GooDNOW, PRINCIPI.£5, p. 401. 
59 GooDNOW, op. cit., p. 435; 3 CoRNEI.I. L. QuAR'l'. 3o8; State v. Gov-
ernor, 25 N. J. L. 331 (1856). In other cases, refusal to mandamus the 
chief executive is based largely on the discretion of the court to refuse to 
issue the writ, such discretion being affected by the doctrine of separation 
of powers. 
60 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W. 83, at p. 89 (1912). See also State Publishing 
C<>-.; v. Smith, 23 Mont. 44, 57 Pac. 449 (1899) (approval of state printing 
contract by governor and state treasurer) ; Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. 
S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct. 938 (1914) (suit to enjoin Secretary of Treasury from 
lowering duty on sugar); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827) (conclu-
siveness of President's determination that imminent danger of invasion 
exists, before calling out the militia). 
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out the difference between the approval of a 'bond by a· clerk of a 
court and the approval of a bond by the Board of Railroad Com-
missioners. A little further on the court says :-"For good faith 
in such matters they are responsible to the public, and not to the 
sureties. "61 
The prominence of the office, _if it be an elective one, is important 
in determining the probability of effective control by the electorate. 
The judiciary is only one agency of several which can exercise con-
trol over administrative action, 62 and in determining whether or not 
it will exercise control in a particular case, the court may, not im-
properly, consider the probability of other method& of control being 
effective. However, the prominence or pettiness of the official does 
not characterize the act; the approval of a bond by a clerk is the 
same kind of official act as the approval of a bond by a state railroad 
comm1ss10n. The differences between the two, for purposes of 
judicial control, rest upon grounds of pure expediency, which are 
often concealed beneath the words "ministerial" and "discretion-
ary." 
6. Investigation or Deterniination of Facts. Does the circum-
stance that the official must investigate and reach a conclusion as 
to the existence of facts before doing the official act make it a "dis-
cretionary" act? One would hardly .think so, since the official does 
not live in a vacuum, ~s not completely walled in by the pages of a 
statute book; and must inevitably ascertain the existence of some 
facts in order to perform the simplest official act. Accordingly, it 
is commonly said :-"That a necessity may exist for th~ ascertain-
ment, from personal knowledge or by information derived frolll 
other sources, of the state of facts on which the performance of the 
act becomes a clear and specific duty, does not operate to convertit 
61 139 N. W. 91. See a1so State Publishing Co. v. Smith, supra, n. 6o, 
where it is said that the governor and treasurer are responsible to the people 
alone. "It is not for the court to correct their consciences." The possi-
bility of control by non-judicial agencies is strongly emphasized. 
62 MA'r°Hl~WS, PRINCIPLl>S OF STA'.l'E ADMINISTRATION, p. 9, enumerates 
five forms of control over administrative action: "Popular, political, legis-
lative, judicial, and administrative." See also GoonNow, PRINCIPLES, 370 
ad fiit. 
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into an act judicial in ·its nature. Such is not the judgment or dis-
cretion, which is an essential element of judicial action."63 • 
This negative form of statement has led to an affirmative form, 
the converse of the foregoing, which if logically applied would un-
duly widen the scope of judicial control :-"That the duty is min-
isterial when it is to be performed upon a certain state of facts, 
although the officer or body must judge according to their best abil-
ity whether the facts exist, and whether they should perform the 
act, seems to be the rule established by the weight of authority; 
otherwise, it is obvious that no mandamus could ever lie in any case 
against public officers."~4 · 
On the other hand, it is said :-"If the duty is one that neces-
sarily involves an inquiry of fact and an exercise of judgme-nt upon 
the case presented it is not ministerial, and the disposition made of 
it will be binding on the courts."65 
Inasmuch as every official act must be preceded by the ascertain-
ment of some fact by the official, and "involves" the exercise of 
some judgment (unless "judgment" means an exceptional degree 
of intelligence, though the matter is not usually put as a question 
of degree), obviously this statement offers no criterion. 
One of the most unlearned yet enlightening opinions on this sub-
ject which the writer has seen is that in Morton v. Coniptroller Gen-
eral,66 an application for a mandamus to compel the defendant, 
comptroller, to levy a tax to pay the interest on state bonds. In 
granting the writ, the court said:-
63 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884), at p. 426; quoted with approva'l, 
GoonNow, PRINCIPLO:S, p. 405; People v. May, 251 Ill. 54. 57, 95 N. E. 999 
(19n), and in many other cases. "The ascertainment of a fact which raises 
the' duty, or is collateral to its performance, is not such an exercise of 
judgment as will deprive the duty of its ministerial character." State v. 
Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14 Atl. 392- (1go8), citing Grider v. Tally. 
64 Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 102, 123 N. W. 705 (1909) (county 
commissioners and county superintendent decided a "majority of the quali-
fied electors" had not signed a petition for consolidation of school districts; 
·mandamus issued, the court having decided to the contrary). 
65 State v: Howard, 83 Vt. 6, at p. 14, 74 At'l. 392 (1908) (allowance 
of claims for trayeling expenses of official by state auditor, conclusive in 
action by state to recover back the '~sums" paid). See also Wailes v. Smith, 
76 Md. 469, 25 Atl. 922 (1893). 
66 4 s. c. 430 (1873). 
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"The fact that a reasonable doubt exists as to some necessary 
fact on which the duty of performance depends does not interfere 
with the certainty of the duty where the ascertainment of such fact 
is the proper subject of jwlicial inquiry, for in that case the officer, 
if doubtful as to the fa<:t, may put the party demanding perform-
ance to proof of such fact in a proper judicial proceeding, as in 
mandamus . . . where, as is sometimes· the case, a public officer 
or a public body is clothed with power to determine conclusively 
the existence of any fact as bearing on the performance of a public 
duty, a discretion on the part of the officer may exist interfering 
with the certainty of the duty demanded, so that a court might not 
be justified in treating such fact as a matter for judicial entertain-
ment, when the remedy seeks to enforce specifically such a duty."67 
The naive suggestion that official action can wiit until the salutary 
judicial remedy has dissipated the official doubt, may be passed 
over. The engaging candor of the court in stating thaf an official 
has discretion because his determination of fact is conclusive, rather 
than the reverse, that his determination of fact is conclusive be-
cause he has discretion, reminds one of the small boy, in the fable 
about the magic garment which only the virtuous could see, who 
cried out that the king had nothing on. 
Since most offices in America today are created and regulated 
by written law, constitutional or statutory, the written law may 
provide or indicate whether or not the official's determination of 
facts is to be conclusive against all or some forms of judicial at-
tack. To this extent the exercise and extent of exercise of judicial 
control over the administration will (assuming the statute to be 
constitutional) be settled by the legislature- and the courts have 
merely to obey. Where, as is usually the case, the legislature, 
which is more apt to thfok of the interests of society than of indi-
vidual interests,68 fails to indicate clearly the effect to be given to 
administrative decisions of fact when judicially questioned, the 
courts must determine this effect by reference to a wide variety 
of factors. ' 
Where the statute empowers the official to administer oaths and 
67 4 S. C. 474. The italics are the present writer's. 
68 Freund, "Interpretation of Statutes," 65 UNIV. OF PA. L. ruv. 207, at 
p. 215 (1917). 
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take evidence on certain issues of fact, the official determination of 
fact is more apt to be treated as conclusive than where no such pro-
cedural details are prescribed, not only because this indicates a leg-
islative intent to confer discretionary power, but also be~ause the 
"due process" requirement is in many cases met by such provisions.68• 
Where the statute enumerates the facts on which official action is 
to be predicated, the courts will frequently call such facts "juris-
dictional" and hold the official's determination of such facts not 
conclusive on judicial attack.69 Where the official's determination 
of fact is wholly subject to judicial review, (as in the nµisance 
cases) he really has no "jurisdiction" in the proper sense of the 
term and it seems useless to call the facts "jurisdiCtional." 
7. Acts Involving the Interpretation of Statu.tes. The powers· 
and functions of American administrative officials are, in theory at 
least, enumerated and defined in statutes; there are no unenumer-
ated or residuary administrative powers.70 In order to perform 
most, if not all, of his official acts, the official must, therefore, have 
recourse to and interpret the statute or statutes which purport to 
constitute the breath of his official being. Perhaps the "interpre-
tation" may be so simple as to be scarcely the result of conscious 
thought; or perhaps it may require a high degree of intelligence. 
At all events, every official act, broadly speaking, "involves" the 
interpretation of a statute (or, a constitutional provision), and 
therefore that an official act "involves" the interpretation of a stat-
ute or even of ·several statutes would seem to be no ground for 
_ classifying it as "discretionary." Such is the view generally ac-
cepted. Thus, it is said :-"A decision which rests solely upon the 
G&• North German Lloyd, etc., Co. v. Hedden, 43 Fed. 17 (18go); Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central .R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 30 
Sup. Ct. 155 -(1909); Provident Saving Life Assur. Soc. v. Cutting, 181 
Mass. ·261, 63 N. E. 433 (1902). 
Go Holmes, J., in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891) (action for 
killing sound horse under statute authorizing "killing of horse infected with 
farcy or glanders; held, that the officials had jurisdiction to kill only horses 
actually-i. e., found by the court-so infected). Hutton v. Camden, 39 
N. J. L. 122 (1876) (abatement of nuisance; existence of nuisance, judi-
cially found, was "jurisdictional") ; People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of 
Health, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893). 
1<> MA'l'Hr:ws, ·op. cit., pp. 10, 12; FREUND, 9 PoL. SCL QuAR. 413; GHosr:, 
CoMPARA'l'IVr: ADMINIS'l'RA'l'IVr: LAW (1919), p. 256. 
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construction of a statute does not involve the exercise of j_udgment 
which the law contemplates."71 For mandamus cases the follow-
ing statement is typical :-"Where the duty is such as necessarily 
requires the examination of evidence and the decision of questions 
of law and fact, such a duty is not ministerial; but an act is none 
the less ministerial because the person performing it may have to 
satisfy himself that the state of facts exists under which it is his 
right and duty to perform the act, and although in so doing he must 
to such extent construe a statute by which the duty is imposed."72 
The statement is so self-contradictory as to be meaningless. No 
doubt it represents an -attempt to r~concile the cases which have 
held the official interpretation of the statute to be conclusive, with 
those where it has been held clearly not. The latter are more nu-
merous. For instance, even where the statute expressly called for 
the construction of a statute by the attorney-general, it was held 
that his act was "ministerial."73 
The process called "interpretation" usually is more complex than 
the word indicates; it involves the application of the statute, filling 
in gaps, and even choosing the statute to be applied; it is there-
fore frequently so bound up with the official act itself that to re-
view the one would be to deny conclusiveness to the other. 
The United States Supreme Court has on several occasions held 
that it will not overturn the interpretation of a statute by an execu-
tive official.74 In other cases it has denied conclusiveness to the 
11 State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, at p. 14, 74 At!. 392. 
12 Judge A. L. Sanborn in 26 CYc. 161, quot~ in Stephens v. Jones, 24 
S. D., at p. 102. Similar statements occur in a number of other cases. 
73 People ex. rel. v. Rosendale, 5 Misc. Rep. 378, 25 N. Y. Supp. 76g. 
( 1893). See also State ex rel. Jones v. Cook, 174 Mo. 100, 73 S. W. 489 
(1903) (secretary of state's refusal to issue certificate to private bankers, 
based ~n erroneous interpretation of statutes; mandamus granted). 
74 Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840) ("A resolution of Congress, 
requiring the exercise of so much judgment_ and investigation, can, with no 
propriety, be said to command a mere ministerial act to be done by the 
secretary"); U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 48 (1888); U. S. ex rel. Riverside 
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 6g8. See also Wailes v. 
Smith, Comptroller, 76 Md. 46g, 25 Atl. 922; American Casualty Ins. Co. v. 
Fy1er, 6o Conn. 448, 22 Atl. 494 (1891) ("The construction of a statute is 
not a ministerial act"). 
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official's interpretation.75 In Roberts v. U. S.,76 Peckham, J., dis-
tinguislied U. S. v. Black,11 a very similar case, by saying that in 
the latter case the official act involved the interpretation of two 
statutes, in the former, only one. Absurd as this distinction may 
seem at a glance, it is not necessarily absurd if it represents an 
arbitrary line between two conflicting principles which shade off 
into one another by insensible degrees. However, it is believed 
there are no such principles. On the contrary. it would seem that 
the interpretation of two statutes, being a more difficult task, would 
be a clearer case for judicial interference than the interpretation 
of one. The more doubtful it is whether the official is right, the less 
chance there is of correcting his mistakes.78 Summa jus, sttninia 
injuria. 
8. "Ministerial Duties" and "Discretionary Duties." Instead of 
"ministerial acts" and "discretionary acts", the distinction is often 
drawn between "ministerial, ·duties" and "discretionary duties". 
Thus, Professor Goodnow says:-" As opposed to the ministerial 
or mandatory duties are the discretionary or judicial duties."79 
How can one speak of a "discretionary duty"? On its face the 
expression is a contradiction in terms, for one cannot be under a 
duty to perform an act, or to refrain from performing it, if he has 
a discretion, i. e. a choice, as to whether or not he will perform it. 
A closer an~.lysis will disclose that tl{e contradiction in terms is due 
to the use of "discretion" and "duty" in different senses. 
(a) In the first place, "duty" has a narrow and a broad mean-
ing. One speaks of the "duties" of a public official, meaning his 
functions as such. Thus, it is the "duty" of the President to call out 
the militia in time of invasion, it is the "duty" of the prosecuting at-
torney to institute criminal proceedings against violators of the 
laws, and it is the "duty" of the recorder of deeds to file or record 
conveyances of real estate. In these cases we are not thinking of 
75 Roberts v. U. S., 176 U. S. 221, 230 (1899); American School of 
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94. 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (1902). 
76 176 U. S. 221, at p. 230. 
77 Supra, n. 74. 
'is This line of reasoning is neatly brought out in State ex rel. v'. Gov-
ernor, 25 N. J. L. 331, at p. 350. 
79 GooDNOW, PRINCIPLIIS, p. 2g6. The same terminology is found in 
many of the above quotations :,ind in many other cases. 
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specific redress through judicial process, for the violation of the 
"duty." The word does connot,_ loosely, the idea of obligation; 
but the obligation may be one which can be enforced only through 
some non-judicial agency, if at all. Thus, in the two examples first 
named-the President and the prosecuting attorney-no judicial 
remedy would be available for a breach of the duty. The legisla-
ture might impeach the official, the electorate might repudiate him 
or his party at the polls, public opinion might bring pressure to 
bear upon him; or, in other cases, the official might be removable 
by a higher administrative authority. Professor Goodnow calls 
these latter "moral duties."80 This terminology seems inaccurate; 
since "moral duties" are generally those for which there is no gov-
ernmental sanction at all; whereas here there is a definite sanction 
operating not alone through the force of unorganized public opinion 
but also through such definite and organized governmental organs 
as the electorate, the legislature, and removing officials. 
In another sense, "duty" means obligation, a violation of which 
is followed by redress through judicial action. If the dominant 
theory of the nature of law-rules laid down by the courts for the 
determination of legal rights and duties81-is accepted, then only 
these latter duties are "legal duties." Since it is conceded that 
courts will not interfere where the "duties" are "discretionary," it 
follows that these "duties" are not legal duties at all and ought 
not to be called by that name where the object of the discussion is 
to determine whether or not the courts will review official action.82 
(b) The word "discretionary" has a double meaning here, too. 
In a sense, all duties, even legal duties, are "discretionary" in that 
the subject of the duty has the power to violate the duty. Thus, 
if a health official is under a legal duty not to destroy innocuous 
property, he may actually destroy it nevertheless.83 In this sense 
80 GooDNOW, op. cit., pp. 297, 299. . 
s:i.GRAY, Tm~ NATURS AND SouRC:SS oF TH£ LAW, Chap. IV. The ele-
ment of judicial enforcement was not insisted upon by the earlier analytical 
jurists. HoLI,AND, ]URISPRUDENCS (Ed. IO), p. 40; AUSTIN, ]URISPRUDENCS 
(Ed. 4), Lecture r. 
s2 Professor Goodnow was discussing other means of control over offi-
cial action in addition to the judiciary, and hence his use of "discretionary 
duties" is not so objectionable. 
83 Of course, he may be enjoined from destroying it, or be prevented 
by the owner's exercise of self-help, or be physica1ly unable to get at it. 
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he has "discretion". But he has no privilege of destroying the in-
nocuous property, nor is he immune from action at the suit of the 
individual injured. In this sense, then, he has no "discretion"; and 
this is the sense in which "discretion" is used in those cases where 
the official action is directly attacked, as by injunction, mandaniies, 
·or action for damages. Bence, the term "discretionary duties" is, 
for purposes of judicial reasoning, a misnomer. 
9. Legal Conseqitences. of the Official Act. In a few instances 
an effort has been made to throw light on the nature of the official 
act by analyzing the legal consequences attending its performance 
or non-performance. Thus, in People e.x rel. Schwab v. Grant,84 
cited and relied on in Sanmels v. Couzens,85 where a statute pro-
vided that· "the mayor shall have authority to grant licenses" to 
auctioneers, the court said :-"A power to grant a privilege to one 
is inconsistent with the possession on the part of another of an 
absolute right to exercis.e such privilege. The requirement that a 
person must secure leave from someone to entitle him to exercise 
a right, carries. with it, by natural implication, a discretion on the 
part of the other to refuse to grant it, if in his judgment, it is im-
proper or unwise to give the ~equi~ed consent."86 
The reasoning here is : The mayor has a power87 to grant a li-
cense; therefore he has power to refuse a license; therefore he has 
a privilege (absence of duty) to refuse a license, and (or). an im-
munity from mandamus suit for such refusal. The reasoning is a 
petitio princ.ipii, for .the very point to be determined is whether or 
not he has such a privilege or immunity. One could as well argue 
that because a recorder of deeds has a power to record a deed 
(thereby affecting the rights of claimants to the property described 
in the deed), therefore he has a power to refuse to record the deed 
84 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 954 (1891). 
85 Supra, n. I. The reasoning in this extract is about all that the court 
gives by way of explaining its decision. 
- 8a 126 N. Y., at p. 481. 
s7 The terminology here is based on Pound, "Legal Rights," z6 !N'.r~N. 
J OUR. OF ETHICS 92; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LA ws, I, I, § 139; Hohfeld, "Some 
Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," 23 YALE L. 
]OUR. 16; Corbin, "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29 ibid. 163. The 
writer is not, however, prepared to accept the Hohfeldian scheme of "jural 
opposites" and "jural correlatives." 
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(he undoubtedly has such a naked power, though it may result in a 
breach of duty), therefore he has a privilege of refusing, a proposi-
tion which by no means follows: The danger of attempting to solve 
the problem purely by legal analysis is apparent. Legal analysis 
never solves problems; it merely clarifies thought and clears the 
ground for a discussion of the real issue involved.88 
A similar attempt to define "ministerial duty" in terms of legal 
consequences is found in M ort01i v. •Comptroller General&fl :-"A 
duty is ministerial when an individual has such a legal interest in 
its performance that neglect of performance becomes a wrong to 
such individual." 
While this gives no answer to the crucial question whether the 
particular neglect which harms some individual interest is a legal 
wrong, i. e. a breach of a judicially enforceable duty owed to a pri-
vate individual, it does indicate that the duty in question is one 
owed to a private individual as distinguished from one owed to the 
state. In England the writ of mandamus was issued in the name 
of the King, the private individual being merely a relator; and the 
duty sought to be enforced was conceived of as a duty to the 
Crown-what. Austin calls an "absolute duty".00 This distinction, 
it seems, is still maintained in England, where there is a "writ of 
mandamus", corresponding to the ancient writ, and an "action of 
mandamus" which is purely a proceeding for the breach of a duty 
owed to an individual as such.01 In most jurisdictions in' this coun-
try, mandamus is treated as a civil action for the breach of a duty 
owed to an individual, i. e., a "relative duty." The shifting of em-
phasis has not always been perceived, as is shown by the use of 
such loose phrases as "discretionary duties." 
Analytically, then, the problem of distinguishing between minis-
terial and discretionary acts resolves itself into determining the 
existence or non-existence of such a relative legal duty. Ordinarily, 
a court will inquire into all the facts and circumstances, and deter-
mine for itself whether the defendant was unqer a legal duty to 
the plaintiff, and if so, whether or not it was violated; the court's 
ss Corbin, op. cit., 29 Y,u,-s L. JoUR. 237. 
so 4 S. C. 430, at p. 474-
oo Aus'l'IN, JURISPRUDENCE (Ed. 4), Lecture 17; POUND, op. cit., p. 94-
91 ODG!lRS, THE COMMON LAW oF ENGLAND (Ed. 10 of BROOM'S Co:r.i:-
:MENTARIES, 19n), II, II42-3, n63-6. See a1so SPEI.LIN<?> op. cit.,§ 1363. 
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investigation will not be precluded or· even, for most purposes, 
affected by the circumstance that the defendant has decided that 
he was under no such duty. If officials were uniformly held to 
answer in judicial proceedings as individuals are, were uniformly 
subjected to what Mr. Dicey calls "the rule of law," all official acts 
would be "ministerial." But it is just here that the official differs 
from the private citizen. The official may have the power, by 
deciding or acting in certain ways or under some circumstances, of 
creating in himself a privilege (absence of duty) of acting or not 
acting so as to affect injuriously individual interests, even though 
a court might later think he made a mistake; and of creating an 
im~unity against judical investigation to determine if he did make 
a mistake. 
The official may have the power to affect the legal rights, duties, 
privileges or immunities of the individual, to others than the official, 
as in the case of a licensing official92 or_ a recorder of deeds (p_er-
haps), by his refusal to act; or he may not have such a power, as 
in the case of a sheriff selling a third person's property on execu-
tion (the sale being void because the sheriff has no power to trans-
fer title). It is not the presence or absence of this power which 
enables one t6 class the official act as ministerial or discretionary, 
92 A licensing official has the power of depriving (by refusal) an appli-
cant of a privilege or immunity against criminal prosecution, and thus the 
denial produces legal consequences, even though the official was, for some 
, purposes, acting "ministerially." 'I'hus, it is generally held that the circum-
stance that an applicant for a license might have compelled its issuance by 
mandamus or have maintained an action against the official for the damage 
caused by its refusal, is no defense to a prosecution for engaging in the 
particular vocation without a license. State v. Myers, 63 Mo. 324 (1876) 
(broker's tax license); New York v. 503 Fifth Avenue Co., 90 Misc. 277, 
r53 N- y_ Supp. 7 (1915) (sign license); Armour & Co. v. Comm., IIS Va. 
312, 79 S. E. 328 (1913) (merchant's tax license); State v. Stevens, 78 N. 
H .. 268, 99 Att:723 (1916) (lightning-rod agent's license); State v. Doer-
ring, 194 Mo. 3g8, 415, 92 S. W. 489 (1905) (dentist's license); People v. 
Ratledge, 172 Cal. 401, 156 Pac. 455 (1916) (chiropractor's license); 23 
Cvc. ·I20 (n. 70, citing many other cases) and 15 R. C. L. 392, as to 1iquor 
licenses. But see Royall v. Virginia, n6 U. S. 572, 6 Sup. Ct. 510 (1886) 
(lawyer's tax license; the license is a mere receipt for the tax); State v. 
Cooper, II Ida. 219, 81 Pac. 374 (1905) (physician's license).. In all these 
cases except the last two the court apparently assumed that the issuance of 
the license would have been "ministerial" in a mandamus suit. 
MINISTERIAL OFFICIAL ACTS 
but the presence or absence of the power in the official to create a 
privilege and (or) an immunity in himself, by his own decision or 
action, in relation to the individual whose interests are affected. 
This latter kind of official power may, in order tO preserve the tra-
ditional terminology, be called "discretionary official power." The 
term "discretionary power" is coming more and more to be used in 
place of "discretionary act"-e. g., in the two cases cited at the 
beginning of this article .. 
This is only a way of stating the problem, analytically. The courts 
have still to determine whet~er, under the circumstances of the par-
ticular case, this discretionary power exists. Where no individual 
interests are affected by the act of the official, no question of dis-
cretionary power arises; this follows from the limitation of the 
concept to judicial proceedings brought to protect or vindicate indi-
vidual interests. The official's duty to the state, whether judicially 
enforceable or othenvise enforceable, is not taken into account. 
Only by narrowing the concept can it be made useful. 
From the preceding discussion, one might infer that the courts 
have no law on the subject of discretionary powers, that each case 
is decided subjectively, and the result is not predicable. Certainly 
there is a basis for such pessimism. In many of the cases in man-
danms, for instance, the court seems to reach its conclusions on 
grounds of policy and then attempts to "rationalize"03 this conclusion 
by some shibboleth, such as those above quoted.94 One may even 
be led to assume that the courts veer toward interference or non-
interference in time-cycles,0" and that "administrative law," if there 
be such a thing, is a purely negative concept.06 It is believed, how-
ever, that this overstates the case. To the present writer it seems 
that, with the increasing willingness of courts to recognize adminis-
trative agencies as coordinate and independent governmental organs, 
the problem of judicial control resolves itself more and more into 
a problem of statutory interpretation. And while legislative draft-
os Professor JA'M~S HARVEY ROBINSON, in "TH~ MIND IN TH~ MAKING" 
(I92I), p. 40, has an interesting discussion of this type of thinking. 
94 Siepra, under subdivisions -3, 6, 7, and 8. 
os Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAL~ L. 
JoUR. 781, especially p. 7if>, n. 55. 
96 Ibid., p. 783. 
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ing is rudimentary ·(particularly so in regard to administrative pro-
visions) and judicial notions of interpretation are elemental, yet 
certain factors may be predicated as having, shall we say, "more 
or less to do" with the result. It is now proposed to expose sum-
marily some of these factors. 
10. Policy or Purpose of the Legislation. Functionally, the prob-
lem of discretionary power has been stated thus: "The best service 
administraj:ive law can perform in this particular field (individual 
·rights) is : (I) First, to see that the administration is not allowed 
to make its own laws, be judge of its own cause and execute its 
own _de~rees except where these may be absolutely necessary. It 
must, in other words, discriminate (1) between cases where the 
administration must take the law from the legislature direct and 
others where, owing to the speciai.information at its [the adminis-
~rative agency's] command, the legislature must be content to leave 
it to the administration to work out in detail the principles which 
alone the former is in a position to prescribe by statute; (2) 
between cases where the rule of law can and should be framed in 
unconditional fanguage (in which case its enforcement must, as a 
rule, be left to the law' courts), and cases where that is not possible 
(in which case, necessarily, the administr~tion must be given power 
to exercise a quasi-judicial juri~diction); and (3) between cases 
where public interests will not suffer if the administration was · (sic) 
to appeal ·to the law courts for the enforcement of its orders and 
others where they must suffer irreparable injury if the a"dministra-
tion were left to enforce them through the litigious procedure of 
the law courts."97 
This states __ the legislature's problem as well as the court's prob-
lem. The court's problem is to ascertain the policy an.d purpose of the 
statute and the means adopted for giving effect to that policy, in 
order to decide whether or not the official empowered to act is given 
discretionary power in reference to a given decision or act. Thus, 
in Lloyd v. Ramsay, mi the court said: "We cannot be unmindful 
97 GROSE, CoMPARA'l'IVE ADMlNlS'l'RA'l'IVE LAW (Calcutta, 1918), p. 588. 
98 183 N. W., at p. 338. Tpe reference to other statutes is an interest-
ing departure from the traditiona'l common-law view that statutes do not 
declare principles but merely make rules for exceptional cases. In Roman 
law, principles were derived from statutes as well as from the traditional 
juristic materials. See Dig. I, 3, 12, 18, and 26-28. 
MINISTERIAL OFFICIAL ACTS 875 
of the history of the times in which we live nor can we shut our 
eyes to the declared policy of the state,.not only by this, but by other 
statutes, to bring corporations organized under the laws of the state 
of Iowa under the.direct investigation of a competent tribunal, so 
that corporations \vhose methods of business may be against public 
policy or 'otherwise objectionable' shall not be permitted to organize 
and do business in this state." 
Again, in People e~ rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board of Den-
tal Ezaminers9° the court discusses the policy of the statute regu-
lating the practice of dentistry, and concludes that, to effectuate the 
purpose of the act, the board had discretionary power in determin-
ing what was a "reputable college,'' although the statute was man-
datory in its langilage. In People ez rel. Schwab v. Grant100 the 
court reviewed the history of the regulation of auctioneers, and 
concluded that the purpose of the particular statute was to limit 
the mmiber of auctioneers and that the mayor had discretionary 
power in determining that number. On the other hand, in People 
ez rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Commission,101 
the same court concluded the object of the statute as to licensing 
race-tracks was not to allow the commission to limit the number or 
to restrict competition, but to insure honest and "proper" races. 
Examples of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely. 
On the other hand, some courts shy at this type of reasoning. In 
Samuels v. Couzens there is not a word as to the object of the ordi-
nance, except that it is a regulatory license and not a taxing license. 
This conclusion is reached by adverting to the smallness of the fee 
exacted for the license. The licensing power is usually con£ erred 
with one of three objects in view: regulation, revenue, or registra~ 
tion. Sometimes it is a combination of two or all three of these 
objects. Where the object is to raise revenue (as in the case of 
many municipal license taxes102) or for mere registration ( e. g., 
automobile licenses, in many instances), the official has generally no, 
or a narrowly limited, discretionary power. Where the object is 
99 IIO III. 18o (1884). 
1"0 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. g64 (1891~. 
101190 N. Y. 31, 82 N. E. 723 (1907). 
102 See State v. Myers, szipra, n. 92; Armour & Co. v. Comm., ibid.; 
Royall v. Virginia, ibid. 
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regulation,1<>3 the official is generally, but not universally,164 con-
ceded to have discretionary power within some limits and the con-
troversy usually raises the question whether he has acted within 
those limits in acting as he did upon particular grounds and with 
reference to particular facts. To determine these limits, resort may 
be had by the court to the particular policy or object of the statute, 
as in Lloyd v. Ramsay/00 People ex rel Schwab v. Grant,106 and 
many other cases. On the other hand, it seems unsatisfactory to 
solve a particular problem, as in Samuels v. Couzens, by merely 
saying that the official had discretionary power, without a more 
exact analysis to determine whether the particular official act falls 
within the limits of that power. The distinction often made betwe_en 
"absence of discretion" and "abuse of discretion" is not of much 
. practical importance in deciding particular controversies. 
To allow the court to determine the policy or purpose of the 
statute involves certain dangers. At best, it introduces an element 
of uncertainty which can never be wholly avoided, no matter how 
carefully a statute is framed.107 At worst, it gives the individual 
judge an opportunity to give vent to his hostility toward govern-
mental encroachments on the sphere of individual liberty, which 
has made much of our voluminous legislation ineffective in opera-
tion. Furthermore, the legislature frequently leaves the policy of 
legislation indefinite, and the court must resort to extrinsic sources 
to determine the precise scope of the regulation. 
II. "Mandatory" or "Pernvissive" Language of the Statute. It 
is frequently said that the distinction between ministerial and dis-
cretionary acts is the same as that between mandatory and directory 
statutes.108 The most that can be said is that such words as "shall," 
"must," tend to negative a very wide scope of discretionary power, 
while "may," "shall have authority to," etc., tend even more strongly 
10s As in Samuels v. Couzens, supra, n. l; People ex rel. Sheppard v. 
Illinois State Board, .mpra, n. 99; People v. Grant, supra, n. loo. 
1°4E. g., State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175 (1876) (insurance 
commissioner); Guy L. Wallace & Co. v. Ferguson, 70 Ore. 3o6, 140 Pac. 
742 (1914) (same). 
105 Supra, n. g8. 
1<>6 Supra, n. 100. 
11()1 GENY, METHODE n'!N'l'lUlPRE'l'ATION (Ed. 2), §§ 54-59. 
10s See GoonNow, PRINCIP.!.llS, pp. 295, 296; 26 CYc. 162. 
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to support the existence of such power. Yet such language is not 
controlling. Thus, permissive language-"may"-is sometimes held 
to impose a duty judicially enforceable ;100 while mandatory lan-
guage has frequently been held not to negative a wide discretionary 
power. Thus, in Lloyd v. Ramsay, 110 the statute read "he ( Secre-
tary of State) shall :file them," yet the "shall" was qualified by con-
ditions which were held to confer discretionary power. So, in Peo-
ple ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board,m the statute read: "But 
said board shall at all times issue a license to any regular graduate 
of any reputable dental college, without examination, upon the pay-
ment by such graduate to the said board of a fee of one dollar." 
Yet it was held that the board had discretionary power in deter-
mining whether a particular dental college was "reputable." These 
examples are not isolated. It seems clear that, in the absence of 
express provisions as to judicial control, no literal interpretation 
will suffice t~ determine the broad question whether the legislature 
has conferred a certain discretionary power upon an official in the 
discharge of a particular function. 
12. Words Denoting Mental Operation. Of somewhat greater 
force in the interpretation of statutes is the use therein of words 
denoting mental operation on the part of the official. Thus, in 
Lloyd v. Ramsay, the statute contained such phrases as "if he is 
satisfied that," "if he is of opinion that," "if the council determines 
that," and this ·1anguage is emphasized by the court. In Samitels v. 
Coitzens, no such words are found, except the provision that the 
applicant must agree that the license "may be revoked at the will 
of the mayor." Usually such language is taken to indicate that the 
statute· confers discretionary power. 
At first blush, it seems absurd to say that the mere fact that the 
legislature authorizes an official to use his mind in performing his 
official functions implies that he is to be "elevated to the bench," 
so to speak, and that his decisions are to be conclusive against judi-
cial attack. No official can perform even the simplest official act 
without reaching a mental decision, and one might assume that the 
loo Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 612; GooDNOW, op. cit., p. 2g6; '!LB£R'.l', 
THI;.M:ECHANICS OF LAW MAKING, p. 121. 
110 Supra, n. 2. 
111 Supra, n. 99. 
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legislature contemplated some mental operation on the part of the 
official in every case. Such an assumption would probably not be 
correct; legislatures are (or perhaps were) conspicuously thought-
less as to methods of administration; and the prevailing attitude of 
the courts has been that statut!!s are interpreted and applied more 
or less mechanically.112 _ 
Where, however, the decision of the official is made .a condition 
precedent to the performance of an official act affecting individual 
interests, the official is in a position to plead his own decision as a 
defense to a mandamus proceeding or an action for damages, and 
thus escape liability to the injured individual. In other words, his 
decision in reference to the particular subject gives him a privilege 
or immunity, and thus he has discretionary'power. Warne v. Var-
ley113 is a leading case. A statute authorized defendants to seize 
skins that were not thoroughly dried. In an action of trespass for 
seizing plaintiff's skins, defendants pleaded the statutes and that 
in their jiedgment th"ey were not thoroughly dried. The plea was 
held bad on demurrer, the court saying that the statute did not 
authorize defendants to seize any leather which was thoroughly 
dried, and intimating that if the words "in their judgment" had 
been in the statute the seizure would have been upheld. The privi-
lege was held to be co-extensive with the power. On the other hand, 
in Sea;m.an v. Patten,114 a meat inspector was held privileged in 
refusing to approve me_at on the express ground that the statute 
read, "if in his opinion," "as shall appear to him," etc. A literal 
interpretation of such a statute sustains the conciusion that the indi-
vidual's right is conditioned on the decision of the official. 
However, the official may be held not to possess a privilege or 
immunity in relation to an infured individual, even though the stat-
ute contains words of mental operation, such as "in his judgment."115 
112 Pound, "Enforcement of Law," 20 Gru>i>N BAG, 404 
11a 6 Durn. & E. 443 (17g5). See also Miller v. Horton, siipra,' n. 6g, a 
better reasoned opinion. 
1142 Caines (N. Y.), 312 (18o5). An interesting example is found in Kan-
sas Home Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 43 Kan. 731, 23 Pac. 1o61 (1890), where the 
amendment to the statute striking out the words "if he shall find that" was 
held practically to have annulled a prior decision of th~ supreme court that 
the insurance commissioner had discretionary power in the particular instance. 
ltG Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W, 942 (1904) (action for dam-
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On the other hand, the absence of such phrases is not conclusive 
against the existence of discretionary power.116 
13. Definiteness or, Indefiniteness of the B,tatittory Administrative 
Norm. Statutes conferring official power may or may not lay down 
or designate the terms upon which the official is to exercise it, the 
norm which is to be applied by the official in the exercise of his 
power. If they do, the power is regulated; if they do not, it is 
unregulated. Such norms vary greatly in definiteness. Much of 
the talk about "questions of law" and "questions of fact," in regard 
to judicial review of administrative decisions, resolves itself into a 
question of the degree of definiteness of the administrative norm.117 
The hard and fast distinction between these two classes of ques-
tions appears to be based upon the assumptions of mediaeval logic,118 
or upon the Kantian metaphysics of noitmenon and phenomenon. 
No hard and fast line can be drawn; the most satisfactory mode of 
treatment seems to be to classify the statutory provisions on the 
basis of degrees of indefiniteness. 
Professor Freund has recently given an excellent classification of 
this sort.'J.10 He gives three classes: "precisely measured terms, 
abstractions of common certainty, and terms involving an appeal 
to judgment or a question of degree." The present writer prefers 
a slightly different classification into "rules," "principles," and 
"standards," on the basis of the classification of legal norms recently 
advocated by Dean Pound.120 The difference between the two classi-
fications is chiefly in the third class. Any attempt to elaborate the 
difference would be beyond the scope of the present discussion. An 
example must suffice. A term such as "against public policy," 
found in the statute in Lloyd v. Ramsay,121 would fall in Professor 
ages against health officer). The nature of the interest affected influences 
the judicial attitude in this class of cases. See supra, subdivision 4, and n. 50. 
116 See, for example, People ex rel. v. Illinois State Board, supra, n. 99; 
Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352, 17 Atl. 375 (1899) (liquor license); Decatur v. 
Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840) (Secretary of Navy, pension). 
117 See Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAL~ 
L. JoUR. 781. 
11s See Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Coi.mrnIA L. R.Ev. 1. 
119 Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Term~ in Statutes," 30 YAI.~ L. 
]OUR. 437. 
120 Pound, "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 44 
AM. BAR ASSN. REP. 445. 
121 Supra, n. 2. 
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. Freund's third class, but would not fall in Dean Pound's third class, 
"standards." It seems bett~r to regard such a- provision as not lay-
ing down any legal norm at all, as a case of "unregulated" discre-
tionary power. On the other hand, such a term as "reputable col-
lege,"122 which Professor Freund places in his third class, seems to 
set up a "standard" calling for the exercise of expert judgment and 
yet limiting the scope of the inquiry and Circumscribing the grounds 
of action in a much greater degree than does "against public policy" 
in the other statute. 
At all events, the courts are much more likely to find that the 
statute confers discretionary power where the terms or norm of 
the statute are indefinite than where they are definite and sharply 
defined.123 Professor Freund probably does not overstate the case 
when he says: "The use of indefinite or flexible terms in tI:ie grant 
of official powers means the grant of discretionary powers."124 On 
the other hand, where the statute lays down a definite norm to guide 
official action, the courts will tend to hold that the power is not dis-
cretionary,125 although the definiteness of the statute is not in all 
cases held to be conclusive against the existence of discretionary 
power.126 
The first part of the much-quoted definition in Flournoy v. J effer-
sonville, 121 "A ministerial act may, perhaps, be defined to ·be one 
which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed 
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without***" 
is probably an attempt to state this distinction between definite and 
indefinite statutory norms.. And the corresponding definition of 
"discretionary act" embodies the same idea: "When an officer is 
ordered by law to do certain things, but the law is general in its 
122 People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board, s1tpra, n. 99. 
1 2a Ibid.; Devin v. Belt, supra, n. u6. The decisions that support this 
conclusion are numerous. 
124 30 YAI.:€ L. JoUR. 451. But see Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (a case 
often cited), where the statute contained such indefinite terms as "respect-
able freeholders,'' "good moral character." 
125 People v. May, 251 Ill. 54, 95 N. E. 999 (19u) ("resident surety'') ; 
Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 123 N. W. 705 (1909); Roberts v. U. S., 
supra, n. 75. 
126 U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888) ; Decatur v. Paulding, mpra, 
n. n6. 
127 S1tpra. 
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phraseology, so that the application of it involves inquiry and deci-
sion, then it is said the duty is a discretionary one."128 
In a way this result is absurd; it seems directly contrary to what 
one would expect of .the courts in their role of guardians of indi-
vidual interests against oppressive action of executive officials. The 
more definite the statutory norm, the easier its application, and 
hence the less the danger of error and oppression by an honest but' 
over-zealous official. The more obvious, too, will be the official's 
violation of the statutory norm, and the easier will be the appeal to 
the non-judicial agencies of control, if these are worth anything. 
On the other hand, the more indefinite norm will be more difficult 
to apply and will offer greater opportunities of error by honest 
officials, to say nothing of discrimination and favoritism by di~honest 
ones.129 This line of reasoning has sometimes been taken by courts, 
not to prove that the official's action is subject to judicial control, 
but as indicating that the absence of judicial control over such indefi-
nite powers renders the provision unconstitutional.130 However, the 
decided trend of recent authority is to support the constitutionality 
of such statutes,131 and the decided trend of legislative practice is 
to use them more and more. 
But if we look at the problem functionally, and assume that the 
legislature has so look~d at it, the distinction is more intelligible. 
The problem is to discriminate "* * * between cases where the 
administration must take the law from the legislature direct and 
others where, owing to the special information at its (the adminis-
trative official's) command, the legislature must be content to leave 
it to the administration to work out in detail the principles which 
128 WYAfAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 34-
129 As said in State v. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331, 350 (1856) (mandamus 
against the governor denied) : "If this be the test, it follows that wherever 
the executive duty is clear the judiciary is authorized to interfere; but in 
aU cases of doubt or difficulty, or uncertainty, the responsibility of acting 
rests upon the executive alone." 
1 3o Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755 (1902) ("to a great 
extent" too indefinite) ; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App. 
(D. C.) 443 (1905) ; Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 750, 63 S. W. 
785 (1901); Welch v. Maryland Casualty Co., 47 Okla. 293, 147 Pac. ro46 
(1915) ("suitable person" as insurance agent). 
131 Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 
(1915), 7 IowA L. Bur,. 38, 39. 
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alone the former is in a position to prescribe by statute * * *"132 In 
other words, indefinite terms in statutes indicate that the legislature 
has delegated to the administrative tribunal the function of further 
amplifying the legislative policy, and the negative conception of 
"separation of powers" leads to the conclusion that the courts can-
not interfere with the legislative delegate in the exercise of his 
delegated powers. If this analysis be correct, the conclusion that 
indefinite statutes mean discretionary powers rests upon two assump-
tions : first, that the legislature has deliberately chosen indefinite 
rather than definite terms in order to more fully effectuate its 
policies; and second, that the statute delegates legislative power in 
greater or less degree. The latter assumption runs counter to the 
dogma that legislative powers cannot be delegated; but this dogma, 
though not expressly repudiated, no longer constitutes a serious 
obstacle, so far as judicial decisions are concerned, to indefinite 
terms in statutes. The first assumption seems scarcely justified by 
present legislative practices. While considerable progress has been 
made in legislative drafting, there is still the need for accurate 
information as to types of administrative provisions and the exercise 
of a careful choice as to the type to be used in a particular statute. 
Professor Freund has recently presented an admirable preliminary 
summary of such information,133 which should be of great value to 
the legislative draftsman in making the deliberate choice which the 
foregoing theory presupposes. · 
r4. Unregulated and Uncontrolled Discretionary Power. In the 
absence of a legal norm in the statute, which the official is to apply 
in performing his official acts, his power is l!nregulated. It by no 
means follows that it is never to be subjected to judicial control. 
It is sometimes said :-"Discretion may be defined, when applied to 
public officials, as the power or right conferred upon them by law 
of acting officially, under certain circumstances, solely according 
to the dictates of their judgment and conscience."134 
132 GHosE, CoMPARA'l'm An:r.trnis'tRATm LAw, p. 588. 
133 Appendix C, Report of the Special Committee on Legislative Draft-
ing, American Bar Association, I92r- meeting. 
134 33 HARV. L. REv. 465. The case cited to support this statement, State 
v. Hultz, I06 Mo. 4I, 50, I6 S. W. 940 (I89I), involves discretion in making 
an apportionment of jury elisors by the court; and the ·opinion distinctly 
states that the decision would be subject to review if "arbitrary or unjust." 
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This statement is too broad. In a case of regulated discretion, 
the statutory norm delimits the scope of the discretionary power, 
and acts in excess of that power are subject to judicial control as 
"abuse of discretion". In a case of unregulated discretion, how 
can the court determine when the official has exceeded his power, 
,, has abused his discretion? This question used to bother the courts, 
and at one time there was a decided tendency to declare unconsti- -
tutional grants of unregulated discretionary power.135 However, 
the decided weight of authority today is to the contrary,136 and the 
question of unregulated discretion has passed from the realm of 
constitutional law to the domain of legislative policy.136a 
The power of an official who acts with entire freedom from ju-
dicial control may be called "uncontrolled". This does not mean 
that he is entirely free to act as he pleases, for he will always be 
subject in greater or less degree to some form of non-judicial con-
trol-political, administrative, legislative, etc. ; and he will likewise 
be subjected, as a rule (the chief executive may be an exception), 
to criminal prosecution for bribery, corruption and perhaps other 
statutory offenses involving gross misfeasance in office. "Uncon-
trolled" is thus a relative term. However, in view of 'the absence 
of effective administrative control in our decentralised state admin-
istrations, and of the feebleness of other forms of control, the ab-
sence of judicial control means practically a wide opportunity for 
oppressive administrative action affecting individual interests. Con-
sequently, examples of uncontrolled discretionary power should be, 
at least until effective administrative control is provided, rare. The 
power of appointment to public office is a prominent example of 
such power. -
Unregulated discretionary power 'is found in two forms: first, 
where the statute contains no language specifying the grounds or 
facts upon which, or the purposes toward which, administrative ac-
1sG Yick Wo v. Hopkins, u8 U. S. 356 (1886), is the 1eading -case. See 
also Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, supra, n. 130; Welch v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
supra, n. 130. 
136 Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct. 317 ( 1899). See 
Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police Power," 24 HARV. L. REv., 
at pp. 277-8; 21 COLUMBIA L. REv. 275, 819. 
136• Thus approaching close to the position which in England is openly 
recognized. See Ir.BERT, THE MECHANICS OF LAW MAKI~G, p. 145. 
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tion is to be taken. Samuels v. Couzens131 presentS' an example of 
this sort. The ordinance laid down no conditions upon which an 
individual was to be granted a jeweler's license; and the individual 
was required to 'agree (which would be tantamount to a provision 
in the ordinance ;138 that it should be revocable "at the will of the 
mayor''. The only clue to the purpose of the licensing power (aside 
from the smallness of the license fee) was the provision that a bond. 
should be given to cover loss to a citizen doing business with the 
licensee. This would indicate that the object of the ordinance was 
regulatory, and was to protect the customers of the licensee against 
some form of conduct by the licensee which would cause them loss 
or damage. The reasons given by the mayor for his refusal-that 
the applicant had deceived and defrauded the public-fall clearly 
within this implied purpose. The court did not concede the mayor 
uncontrolled discretion, since it is distinctly said that the ordinance 
confers a "reasonable discretion". One would like to know, how-
ever, how the court would deal with a C?-Se arising under this ordi-
nance where the mayor's refusal was based on the inexperience or 
incompetency of an honest applicant, br upon the ground that there 
were too many jewelers in Detroit already.130 The court would then 
be called upon to formulate a half-baked legislative policy, to fill 
a vacuum in the legislative mind. It is a task for which courts 
are not well fitted. 
The second type of unregulated discretionary power is exempli-
fied by<'statutes which lay down the conditions of the exercise of 
that power in language so indefinite that it does not rise to the de-
gree of expressiveness of a legal rule, a principle, or a standard. 
Lloyd v. Ramsay140 involves this type of statute. "Against public 
policy" does little more than indicate that the power is to be exer-
cised t~ secure social interests as distinguished from the interests 
of particular official favorites ; but it is a wholly unformulated pol-
icy. The word "hon~_st" ~Y~ a clue to this policy, but does not 
• 1s1 Supra, n. I. 
1as See Metropolitan Mille & Cream Co. v. New York, 113 App. Div. 377, 
98 N. Y. Supp. 894 (19o6). 
1ao E. g., in People v. Grant, supra, n. 99, it was held that the mayor had· 
power to refuse an auctioneer's license on this ground. 
140 Supra, n. 2. 
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necessarily restrict the power of refusal to cases of actual dishon-
esty. There was, in fact, no direct evidence in that case to show 
that the incorporators had any dishonest purposes; and the record 
shows (though the published report does not) that the Secretary 
of State had previously issued certificates of incorporation to othet: 
cQmpanies (not oil companies, however) with a similar disparity 
between the amounts of common and preferred stock. Here again 
the court was obliged to formulate the unformulated policy fo the 
extent that the particular case demanded. The opinion clearly in-
dicates that neither the Secretary nor the Executive Council is given 
uncontrolled power. 
Statutes conferring unregulated discretionary power are becom-
ing more .common. The judicial veto is being withdrawn; such 
statutes are no longer declared unconstitutional per se, without 
regard to the way in which they are applied in the particular case. 
There is a real danger that the judicial abdication in favor of exec-
utive justice will go too far, that unregulated power will become 
uncontrolled. Herein lies a menace to the common law tradition 
of the supremacy of law ;141 for, as Coke says in his commentary 
on Chap. 29 of Magna Charta :-" * * * hereby the crooked cord 
of that which is called discretion appeareth to be unlawful, unless 
you take it, as it ought to be, di.scretio est discernere per lege'J1!, 
quid sit jitstmn."142 
IR view of the amorphous C?ndition of that mass of juristic ma-
terials which some of us are bold enough to call "administrative 
law," it may seem futile to •offer proposals of reform, to do, more 
than sit and \yatch the rising tide of executive justice. Yet this is 
no time for "£utilitarianism". The spirit of the times is that the 
administration of justice can be improved through conscious human 
effort. "There will be no withdrawing from these experiments. We 
shall expand them whether we approve theoretically or not . . . "143 
The immediate task of the lawyer is to develop the technique of 
administrative justice, not only of the administrative .itself, but of 
the legislature and the courts. 
The following conclusions are submitted with deference:-
141 PouND, THJ~ SPIRIT oF THE COMMON LAw, p. 7 and Chap. III. 
142 Con's Sr:coNn INsTrrUTr:S, I, p. 56. 
Ha RooT, AnnR:ESsr:s ON Govr:RNMENT AND CrTrzr:NSHIP, p. 533. 
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I. 1;'.he terms "ministerial act" or "ministerial duty" and "dis-
cretionary act" or "discretionary duty" either have no meaning or 
so many meanings that they are useless, and should be discarded. 
2. The term "discretionary power'', a purely analytical concept. 
is more useful, and is corning into use in place of the terms just 
mentioned. 
3. "Discretionary power" means the power of an official to cre-
ate a privilege or immunity against direct judicial attack by an ag-
grieved individual. 
4. Statutes should be so drawn as to express: (a) The norms 
to be applied by the official invested with power; (b) the method 
and extent of judicial control. 
5. A system of administrative appeals should be provided by 
which a review may be had of those questions of "expediency," or 
"fact," which fall within the cope of discretionary power, and 
·therefore beyond the scope of judicial control. The appeal to the 
Executive Council in Lloyd v. Ranisay is an example. 
6. On the other hand, the courts should not abandon the task, 
difficult though it is, of circumscribing unregulated discretionary 
power. 
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